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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
One of the most frequently used indicators to assess fiscal power of sub-central governments is the 
share of sub-central to total tax revenue. But this indicator says nothing about the true discretion sub-
central jurisdictions have over tax rates and the tax base, and it skips revenue from intergovernmental 
grants entirely. The main purpose of this paper is to develop and analyse a set of more refined indicators 
that assess the true power sub-central governments have over fiscal resources. In sum, fiscal autonomy is 
considerably lower than simple ratios suggest: About 60 percent only of own tax revenue is under full or 
partial control of sub-central governments, and again 60 percent only of transfer revenue is unconditional. 
Moreover, much sub-central tax revenue emanates from mobile income taxes and is prone to tax erosion. 
Whether and how fiscal autonomy affects outcomes such as public sector efficiency, equity in access to 
public services or the long term fiscal stance remains yet open, but the new database can be used for more 
conclusive policy analysis.  
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Keywords: Fiscal federalism, local taxation, intergovernmental transfers, fiscal autonomy, decentralisation 
Copyright OECD, 2006 
Applications for permission to reproduce or translate all, or part of, this material should be made to: 
Head of Publications Service, OECD, 2 rue André-Pascal, 75775 Paris Cédex 16, France. 
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Introduction 
1. State and local governments in OECD countries have access to various fiscal resources. 
Discretion over them varies considerably, and so does sub-central governments’ power to shape their 
budget and to determine outcomes like public sector efficiency, equity in access to public services or the 
long term fiscal stance. Data on the revenue structure of sub-central governments (SCG) would therefore 
be helpful. But indicators have long insufficiently reflected the way state and local budgets are funded. The 
most frequently used indicator is the ratio of SCG to total tax revenue, which is a poor measure for 
assessing the true autonomy SCGs enjoy. Since the power over fiscal revenue is a critical determinant for 
government finance, a set of more refined indicators for assessing fiscal autonomy should be developed.  
2. This article provides data and interpretation on the fiscal resources of sub-central governments in 
a majority of OECD countries. The article is organized as follows: the first section gives an overview on 
revenue and expenditure assignment using the “classical” decentralisation indicator. The second section 
develops the indicator set for sub-central tax revenue autonomy. The third section develops the indicator 
set for intergovernmental grants and the different conditions attached to them. The fourth section assesses 
overall fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments across OECD countries and analyses the relationship 
between various autonomy indicators. The fifth and final section summarizes the findings and shows how 
the new dataset can help assess the impact of fiscal federal design on policy outcomes.  
Decentralisation ratios 
3. The most frequently used measure to compare and assess fiscal autonomy is the share of 
resources and responsibilities assigned to local and regional governments. SCG tax and expenditure 
indicators (or “decentralization ratios”) drawn from National Accounts can help gauge fiscal 
decentralization and its evolution over time. While these indicators can hardly capture the complexity of 
fiscal arrangements, they can give a first impression of how much fiscal power regional and local 
jurisdictions enjoy. The following figures show the current state of financial decentralization as measured 
by sub-central government shares of total tax revenue and expenditure in OECD countries (figure 1) and 
the evolution of these indicators over the last decade (figure 2). 
Figure 1.  Decentralisation ratios in OECD countries, 2004 
Share in general government revenues and expenditure, 2003 
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Source: National Accounts of OECD countries, 2005 
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Figure 2.  Decentralisation ratios, evolution 1995-2004  
Changes expressed in percentage points 
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Source: National Accounts of OECD countries, 2005 
4. The stylized facts shown in these figures can be summarized as follows:  
• The degree of decentralization varies greatly across OECD countries. While the sub-central share 
of total government expenditures varies from less than 6 percent to more than 60 percent, the sub 
central tax share stretches between 3 and 50 percent. The constitutional background of a country 
– whether it is federal or unitary – says little about actual fiscal autonomy. Local governments in 
some unitary countries have a higher share in public spending than local and regional 
governments together in federal countries. 
• The sub-central tax share and the sub-central expenditure share have diverged over the last ten 
years. While the share of sub-national expenditures generally increased, the sub-central tax share 
- with a few notable exceptions –remained almost stable. The rising expenditure share partly 
reflects new responsibilities assigned to sub-central governments such as health care and/or non-
university education in Italy, Mexico and Spain, or active labour market policies in Canada. On 
the other hand, local taxing power was reduced in many countries, such as in France or Japan, 
where local taxes were replaced by intergovernmental transfers.  
• In all countries, sub-central government expenditures by far exceed tax revenue, and this “fiscal 
gap” has widened in the last decade. The difference between responsibilities and resources points 
to large intergovernmental transfer schemes. The fiscal gap tends to be larger in countries with 
high sub-central fiscal autonomy (Canada, Denmark, and – not shown in figure 1 – Switzerland); 
somewhat paradoxically, more decentralization can go hand in hand with more dependency on 
central government resources. Size and structure of intergovernmental grants thus become a 
particular policy issue for decentralizing countries.  
5. A serious problem with these simple ratios, however, is that they only poorly measure the true 
discretion that SCG enjoy in practice. On the revenue side, limits to set tax bases, rates and reliefs reduce 
the extent to which sub central governments can determine the size of their budget. On the expenditure 
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side, local spending may be strongly influenced by upper level government regulation, thereby reducing 
discretion over various expenditure items. In some countries, the transfer of financial responsibility for 
education or health care was hardly more than a change in accounting procedures, while essential 
regulatory power remained with the central level. Moreover, the various conditions attached to 
intergovernmental transfers may further influence the spending pattern of sub-central governments. To 
have a more accurate picture of sub-central fiscal autonomy, a more detailed indicator set is required. 
Taxing power of sub-central governments 
A taxonomy of tax autonomy: history and indicator set 
6. The term “tax autonomy” captures various aspects of freedom sub-central governments have over 
their own taxes. It encompasses features such as sub-central government’s right to introduce or to abolish a 
tax, to set tax rates, to define the tax base, or to grant tax reliefs to individuals and firms. In a number of 
countries taxes are not assigned to one specific government level but shared between the central and sub-
central governments. Such arrangements deny a single SCG any control on tax rates and bases, but 
collectively SCGs may have the power to negotiate the sharing formula with central government. The 
wealth of explicit and implicit, statutory and common, institutional arrangements has to be encompassed 
by a set of indicators that are simultaneously appropriate (they capture the relevant aspects of tax 
autonomy), accurate (they measure those aspects correctly) and reliable (the indicator set remains stable 
over time).  
7. The indicator set comprises five main categories of autonomy and several sub-categories (table 
1). Categories are ranked in decreasing order from highest to lowest taxing power. Category “a” represents 
full power over tax rates and bases, “b” power over tax rates (essentially representing the “piggy-packing” 
type of tax), “c” power over the tax base, “d” tax sharing arrangements, and “e” no power on rates and 
bases at all. Category “f” represents non-allocable taxes. Special attention was paid to tax sharing 
arrangements, where the four “d” subcategories should capture the various rules for determining the 
sharing formula. Altogether 13 categories were established to encompass the various tax autonomy 
arrangements in OECD countries. Where applicable, countries were asked to send separate data for both 
the state/regional and the local level. Since category six “non allocable” was hardly used, the taxonomy 
seems to reflect well the taxing power universe.  
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Table 1. : Taxonomy of taxing power 
a.1 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate and any tax reliefs without needing to consult a higher level 
government. 
a.2 The recipient SCG sets the rate and any reliefs after consulting a higher level government. 
b.1 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate, and a higher level government does not set upper or lower limits on 
the rate chosen. 
b.2 The recipient SCG sets the tax rate, and a higher level government does sets upper and/or lower limits on 
the rate chosen. 
c.1 The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs – but it sets tax allowances only. 
c.2 The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs – but it sets tax credits only. 
c.3 The recipient SCG sets tax reliefs – and it sets both tax allowances and tax credits. 
d.1 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the SCGs determine the revenue split. 
d.2 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split can be changed only with the consent of 
SCGs. 
d.3 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined in legislation, and where it 
may be changed unilaterally by a higher level government, but less frequently than once a year. 
d.4 There is a tax-sharing arrangement in which the revenue split is determined annually by a higher level 
government. 
e Other cases in which the central government sets the rate and base of the SCG tax. 
f None of the above categories a, b, c, d or e applies. 
 
Source: OECD (1999) 
Taxing power in 2002 
8. Although there is wide variation across countries, the stylized facts on taxing power of state and 
local governments in 2002 can be summarized as follows (table 2)1:  
• First, only a part of sub-central tax revenue is under effective control of sub-central governments. 
At the average, the tax revenue share with full or partial discretion (categories a, b and c) 
amounts to around 60 percent for state and 70 percent for local government. In many countries 
(not shown in the table), permitted maximum tax rates often double minimum rate.  
• Second, state and regional governments have less discretion over their tax revenue than local 
governments, since tax revenue of the former is often governed by tax sharing arrangements. On 
the other hand, with 51 percent of SCG tax revenue, the state level has a higher share in high-
powered autonomous taxes (category “a”), while local governments are often allowed to levy a 
supplement on selected regional or central taxes only (category “b” or “piggy-packing” tax).  
• Third, the c category (representing control over the tax base but not the tax rate) plays a 
negligible role in OECD countries. This probably points to a policy of gradually banning tax 
reliefs and abatements as a tool for local and regional economic development, particularly in the 
European Union.  
                                                     
1 . Since for some categories no or very small numbers were reported, some sub-categories were merged and 
their number reduced from 13 to 10. 
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Table 2. Taxing power of sub-central governments, 2002 
As share of sub-central tax revenues
Sub-central 
tax revenue 
as % of total 
tax revenues
Discretion 
on rates 
and reliefs 
(a)
Discretion on rates (b)
Discretion 
on reliefs 
(c
Tax sharing arrangements (d)
Rates and 
reliefs set 
by CG (e)
Other (f) Total
Full restricted
Revenue 
split set by 
SCG
Revenue 
split set 
with SCG 
consent
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, 
pluriannual
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, 
annual
Australia 31.4
 States 28.4 54.4 - - - - 45.6 - - - - 100.0
 Local 3.0 100.0 - - - - - - - - - 100.0
Austria 18.4
 States 8.8 7.0 - - - - 82.7 - - 9.6 0.8 100.0
 Local 9.6 2.7 - 5.4 - - 66.5 - - 20.0 5.5 100.0
Belgium 27.8
 States 22.8 63.8 - - - - 36.2 - - - - 100.0
 Local 5.0 10.0 - 86.4 - - - - - 3.6 - 100.0
Canada 44.1
  Provinces 35.5 98.4 - - - - 1.6 - - - - 100.0
  Local 8.6 1.8 95.6 - - - - - - 2.3 0.3 100.0
Czech Republic 12.5
   Local 12.5 5.5 - 4.1 - - - 88.8 - 1.5 0.1 100.0
Denmark 35.6
   Local 35.6 - 86.0 4.7 - - - 2.9 - 6.4 - 100.0
Finland 21.5
   Local 21.5 - 85.3 4.6 - - - - 9.9 - 0.1 100.0
France 10.0
   Local 10.0 72.1 - 8.5 9.1 - - - - 3.6 6.6 100.0
Germany 28.7
   Länder 21.8 - - 2.4 - - 86.3 - - 11.2 - 100.0
   Local 7.0 17.6 - 33.6 - - 47.6 - - 1.1 0.2 100.0
Greece 0.9
   Local 0.9 - - 64.6 - 35.4 - - - - - 100.0
Iceland 25.2
   Local 25.2 - - 91.2 - - - - - - 8.8 100.0
Italy 16.4
   Regional 11.3 - - 58.8 - - 23.7 17.6 - - - 100.0
   Local 5.2 27.1 - 50.4 - - - 13.1 - 9.3 - 100.0
Japan 26.0
   Local 26.0 0.1 79.7 - - - - - - 20.2 - 100.0
Korea 18.9
   Local 18.9 - - 64.3 - - - - - 35.7 - 100.0
Mexico 3.4
  States 2.4 100.0 - - - - - - - - - 10
  Local 1.0 100.0 - - - - - - - - - 100.0
Netherlands 3.6
   Local 3.6 - 99.2 - - - - - - - 0.8 100.0
Norway 12.9
   Local 12.9 3.3 - 96.7 - - - - - - - 10
Poland 17.5
   Local 17.5 - - 23.2 - - - 76.4 - 0.4 - 100.0
Portugal 6.0
   Local 6.0 - - 44.0 - - - 18.5 - 37.3 0.2 100.0
Spain 26.6
  Regions 18.1 58.3 - 0.1 - - 41.6 - - - 0.0 100.0
   Local 8.5 27.2 - 51.4 - - 21.4 - - - 0.0 100.0
Sweden 32.1
   Local 32.1 - 100.0 - - - - - - - - 100.0
Switzerland 43.1
  States 27.0 90.4 - - - - 9.6 - - - - 100.0
  Local 16.2 2.9 - 97.1 - - - - - - - 10
Turkey 6.5
   Local 6.5 - - - - - - - - - 100.0 10
United Kingdom 4.5
   Local 4.5 - - 100.0 - - - - - - - 10
Unweighted Average
   States 19.6 52.5 - 6.8 - - 36.4 2.0 - 2.3 0.1 100.0
   Local 12.4 15.4 22.7 34.6 0.4 1.5 5.6 8.3 0.4 5.9 5.1 100.0
Source : National source and OECD,  Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
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9. In some countries, SCG have the right to vary tax rates but actually set the same rate across the 
country. Such “unused taxing power” invites a deeper look into fiscal institutions and the incentives they 
generate for tax competition.   
10. Tax sharing agreements account for a large part of sub central tax revenue in most 
constitutionally federal countries (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Mexico, Italy), in constitutionally non-
federal Spain, in the Czech Republic and in Poland. Tax sharing is often considered as providing a balance 
between granting local/regional fiscal autonomy and keeping the overall fiscal framework stable. The 
collective power for sub-central governments to negotiate their tax share varies considerably across 
countries, from arrangements where sub-central governments are in full control over their share, to 
arrangements where the share is unilaterally set and modified by the central government. In some countries 
the distribution formula is enshrined in the constitution and can only be changed with the consent of all or 
a majority of sub-central governments. Tax sharing is discussed in the section on “tax sharing 
arrangements” in more detail. 
Evolution of taxing power 1995-2002 
11. Taxing power increased from 1995 to 2002, albeit unevenly across countries (table 3). The share 
of taxes over which sub-central governments have full or partial control rose by 25 percent points for states 
and 8 percent points for local governments, mostly to the detriment of tax sharing arrangements. Such 
agreements lost significance in countries such as Austria, Belgium, Germany, Mexico or Spain. In Norway, 
local governments gained more autonomy over income taxes, while in Austria and Germany, they lost 
revenue from autonomous local business taxes. In some countries (e.g. France and Sweden) the central 
government is required to compensate the loss of sub-central tax revenue through additional transfers; this 
effect is not shown in table 3.  
12. The forces shaping the evolution of SCG tax revenue and tax autonomy are political, fiscal and 
economic in nature.  
• First and probably most important are policy reforms such as a reassignment of taxes to another 
government level, a change in tax autonomy or a swap between local/regional taxes and 
intergovernmental grants. Constitutional and legislative amendments largely account for the rapid 
change in countries such as Belgium or Spain involved in a secular decentralization process.  
• Second, fiscal reasons such as a relative change in tax rates or bases can also affect the pattern of 
taxing power, e.g. if one government level changes its tax rate or base while another government 
level does not. In many countries rates and base of local property taxes remain unchanged over 
long periods of time, while the bases of central government income taxes or goods and services 
taxes are regularly updated.  
• Third, different taxes react differently to the business cycle or to structural change, and this may 
affect tax revenue of different government levels. A local profit tax reacts more swiftly to an 
economic downturn than a central government income tax, and a local sales tax on goods reacts 
more slowly to the rise of the service sector than a central value added tax.  
13. Altogether, the net effect of the three forces slightly favoured sub-central governments between 
1995 and 2002. Although the share of tax revenue going to the sub-central level hardly changed, the power 
attached to those taxes rose. For most countries no tax erosion could be detected, neither in terms of the 
revenue share nor in terms of autonomy. However, the tax share must be set against the expenditure share, 
which increased considerably in roughly the same period (figure 2). 
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 As a share of sub-central tax revenues
Sub-central 
tax revenues 
as % of total 
tax revenues
Discretion 
on rates 
and reliefs
Discretion on rates Discretion on reliefs Tax-sharing arrangements
Rates and 
reliefs set 
by CG
Other
Full restricted
Revenue 
split set by 
SCG
Revenue 
split set 
with SCG 
consent
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, 
pluriannual
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, 
annual
Austria -0.1
 Länder -1.2 5.0 - - - -15.3 - - 9.6 0.8
 Local 1.1 -5.8 -5.9 - - -14.0 - - 20.0 5.5
Belgium -0.2
 States 0.3 59.8 -47.5 - - -12.3 - - - -
 Local -0.5 -2.5 2.4 - - - -2.5 -1.0 3.6 -
Czech Republic -0.5
   Local -0.5 3.5 -0.9 -3.0 - - -1.2 - 1.5 0.1
Denmark 4.6
   Local 4.6 - -3.8 - - - 0.9 - 2.9 -
Finland -0.5
   Local -0.5 - 0.9 - - - -11.0 9.9 - 0.1
Germany -0.3
   Länder -0.2 - 2.4 - - -13.7 - - 11.2 -
   Local 0.0 16.6 -18.4 - - 0.6 - - 1.1 0.2
Iceland 5.2
   Local 5.2 -8.0 -0.8 - - - - - - 8.8
Japan 2.0
   Local 2.0 0.1 -8.8 - - - - - 8.7 -
Mexico -16.6
  States -13.6 86.0 - - - -86.0 - - - -
  Local -3.0 100.0 - - - - -74.0 - -26.0 -
Netherlands 1.1
   Local 1.1 - -0.8 - - - - - - 0.8
Norway -7.1
   Local -7.1 3.3 94.2 - - - -0.5 - -97.0 -
Poland 10.5
   Local 10.5 - -21.8 -1.0 - - 22.4 - 0.4 -
Portugal 0.8
   Local 0.8 - 0.2 - - - -4.3 - 3.8 0.2
Spain 13.3
  Regions 13.3 44.0 -0.5 - - 31.7 - - - -75.2
  Local 0.0 -1.5 -2.8 - - 6.1 - - - -1.8
Sweden 0.1
   Local 0.1 -2.0 2.0 - - - - - - -
Switzerland 5.1
  States 5.0 1.4 - - - 3.6 -5.0 - - -
  Local 0.2 2.9 0.1 - - - -3.0 - - -
United Kingdom 0.5
   Local 0.5 - - - - - - - - -
Unweighted Average
   States 0.6 32.7 -7.6 - - -15.3 -0.8 - 3.5 -12.4
   Local 0.9 7.9 0.4 -0.2 - -0.4 -3.5 0.5 -5.4 0.8
Source:  National source and OECD, Taxing Powers of State and Local government, Tax  Policy Studies No1 and Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.
Table 2. Table 3. Evolution of tax autonomy of sub-central governments 
Change in 1995-2002 
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Discretion 
on rates 
and reliefs
Discretion on rates Discretion on reliefs Tax sharing arrangements
Rates and 
reliefs set 
by CG
Other Total
Full restricted
Revenue 
split set by 
SCG
Revenue 
split set 
with SCG 
consent
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, 
pluriannual
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, annual
1000 Taxes on income, profits and capital gains 5.9 9.9 10.3 2.8 - 0.8 9.9 0.3 1.5 0.3 41.7
1100 Of individuals 5.2 9.3 8.1 2.8 - 0.8 8.2 - 1.1 - 35.5
1200 Corporate 0.7 0.6 2.2 - - - 1.4 0.3 0.4 0.3 5.9
1300 Unallocable between 1100 and 1200 - - - - - - 0.3 - - 0.0 0.3
2000 Social security contributions 0.1 - - - - - - - 0.0 0.1 0.3
2100 Employees 0.1 - - - - - - - - 0.1 0.2
2200 Employers - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0
2300 Self-employed or non-employed - - - - - - - - - -
2400 Unallocable between 2100, 2200 and 2300 - - - - - - - - - -
3000 Taxes on payroll and workforce 2.4 - 0.2 - - - - - 0.7 - 3.3
4000 Taxes on property 11.5 5.5 9.0 0.3 0.2 - 0.2 - 0.8 - 27.3
4100 Recurrent taxes on immovable property 6.4 5.3 6.4 - - - 0.0 - 0.5 - 18.6
4200 Recurrent taxes on net wealth 0.4 - 1.1 - - - - - 0.0 - 1.5
4300 Estate, inheritance and gift taxes 0.3 - 0.0 - - - 0.0 - 0.1 - 0.4
4400 Taxes on financial and capital transactions 2.5 0.0 1.3 0.3 0.2 - 0.1 - 0.2 - 4.6
4500 Non-recurrent taxes 0.1 0.2 0.2 - - - - - - - 0.5
4600 Other recurrent taxes on property - - - - - - - - - -
5000 Taxes on goods and services 3.4 1.5 1.3 0.0 0.9 4.2 5.2 - 4.5 0.3 21.4
5100 Taxes on production, sale, transfer, etc 2.2 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.9 2.8 5.0 - 3.4 0.3 14.9
5200 Taxes on use of goods and perform activities 1.2 1.5 1.2 - - - 0.1 - 1.1 - 5.1
5300 Unallocable between 5100 and 5200 - - - - - - - - - 0.0 0.0
6000 Other taxes 2.1 0.1 1.4 - - - 0.4 - 1.2 0.6 5.9
6100 Paid solely by business 0.9 0.1 1.4 - - - - - 0.0 0.2 2.7
6200 Other 1.2 - - - - - 0.4 - 1.1 - 2.8
Total 25.5 17.1 22.3 3.0 1.1 5.0 15.6 0.3 8.7 1.4 100.0
1. Unweighted average. Countries included are : Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark,Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Korea, 
   Mexico, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and Turkey.
Source : National sources and OECD, Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.  
Table 4. Tax autonomy of sub-central governments by type of tax 
In percent of sub-central tax revenue  
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Tax autonomy across tax category 
14. The data on tax autonomy by tax type defy the beliefs on optimal local taxation (table 4). While 
fiscal federalism theory asserts that mobile taxes should be allocated to higher levels of government, in 
practice the largest single tax assigned to local and regional governments is the highly mobile income tax 
on individuals, with more than 36 percent of total SCG tax revenue. If local corporate taxes are added, the 
share rises to more than 41 percent. Taxes on goods and account for 21 percent of total SCG tax revenue. 
Taxes on immovable property account for 19 percent only. Although most OECD countries apply some 
sub-central property taxation, its yield is often limited and supplemented or even replaced by other taxes 
such as a local income tax. In more decentralized countries, local income tax revenue largely exceeds local 
property tax revenue.  
15. A closer look at tax autonomy may alleviate the fears of inappropriate tax assignment. Some 
mobile sub-central taxes go with little power only. Especially the highly mobile personal income tax is 
often built into tax sharing arrangements that limit tax competition and potential tax erosion. Moreover, 
fiscal equalization – a set of fiscal transfers that aims at reducing differences in sub-central fiscal capacity 
– may partially offset losses in the revenue of mobile taxes2. Even in cases where sub-central governments 
have the right to set tax rates and bases and could hence enter tax competition, they often do not make use 
of this right for fear of losing other revenue sources. Put together, it appears that countries succeed in 
containing the drawbacks of mobile sub-central taxes, but it would be useful to have a closer look into the 
success of the respective arrangements.  
Tax sharing arrangements 
16. Tax sharing is an arrangement where tax revenue is divided vertically between the central and 
sub-central governments as well as horizontally across sub-central governments. Often tax sharing 
arrangements contain an element of horizontal fiscal equalization. Tax sharing has become a means to 
provide adequate resources to the sub-central level while maintaining central control over fiscal 
aggregates. Tax sharing grants less autonomy to sub-central governments than autonomous taxes, and it 
may also change SCGs’ fiscal behaviour. By turning SCG tax revenue into a common pool resource for all 
government levels, tax sharing may change fiscal incentives and the resulting fiscal outcomes. For both 
statistical and analytical reasons, it is necessary to distinguish carefully tax sharing from intergovernmental 
grants (see box 1). 
17. Tax sharing arrangements can be analyzed on various grounds: the type of tax that is shared, the 
legal procedures involved in changing the formula, the frequency of an adjustment to the formula, and 
whether the sharing formula contributes to an equalizing objective (table 5). 
                                                     
2 . An OECD document, to be published in 2007, will treat the fiscal equalisation issue (OECD, forthcoming). 
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Table 5: Tax sharing arrangements 
Country Tax type shared Procedure for formula changes Frequency of 
formula changes 
Horizontal equalisation 
objective 
Austria PIT, CIT, property 
tax, VAT 
Parliament, Law on Fiscal 
Equalisation 
Every four years yes 
Czech Republic PIT, CIT, VAT Government, Law of Tax 
Assignment 
Irregularly yes  
Denmark PIT, CIT Government, Law on Tax 
Sharing 
Very rarely no 
Finland CIT Government, Law on Tax 
Sharing 
 no 
Germany PIT, CIT, VAT Both Parliaments (Bundestag 
and Bundesrat) 
13 changes since 
1970 
yes 
Greece Transaction and 
specific service taxes 
Central government Rarely no 
Spain VAT, excise duties Parliament Rarely no 
Switzerland PIT Parliament, Law on Fiscal 
Equalisation 
Never since 1959 yes 
Note: PIT=Personal Income Tax, CIT=Corporate Income Tax, VAT=Value Added Tax 
Source: National Sources 
18. Most tax sharing arrangements cover major taxes such as personal income taxes, corporate 
income taxes or value added taxes. Their high yield makes them attractive for the sub-central level, and the 
pooling tackles potential drawbacks of purely local taxation. The procedure for changing the sharing 
formula is mostly laid down in laws on tax sharing, fiscal equalization or the like. For the countries under 
scrutiny, decisions on the tax sharing arrangements seem to be taken at the parliamentary level; in some 
countries the share is defined in the constitution and adjustments require a qualified majority in parliament. 
Consultation of SCG is quite frequent, but their explicit consent for adjustments is needed in some federal 
countries only. The frequency and regularity of formula adjustment varies across countries, from irregular 
to never, but it appears that tax sharing arrangements are a comparatively stable item in national fiscal 
policy. Finally, some countries combine tax sharing and fiscal equalization in one single arrangement.  
Box 1: Drawing a dividing line between tax sharing and intergovernmental grants 
Both tax sharing arrangements (category “d” of tax autonomy) and intergovernmental grants provide resources to 
sub-central governments. Drawing the dividing line between the two fiscal arrangements proves sometimes difficult. 
On one hand, many tax sharing formulae have become so complex that there is no link between what a SCG collects 
on its territory, what it sends into the common pool and what it finally gets back. On the other hand, policy reforms 
have made some intergovernmental grants more look like a share in the national tax yield. While the National Accounts 
and the Revenue Statistics provide some guidelines, in practice what counts as tax sharing in one country may count 
as intergovernmental grant in another; within some countries even, different central government bodies have adopted 
different views on how to classify fiscal resources (e.g. Australia or Belgium). Such lack of clarity jeopardizes the 
coherence of SCG revenue statistics and reduces strength and utility of fiscal design analysis. In order to ensure that 
fiscal arrangements are recorded properly and on a comparative basis, a set of distinctive criteria is required.  
For future statistical work a guideline is proposed that enables a dividing line to be drawn between the two fiscal 
arrangements. The guideline consists of four criteria. The criteria relate to the revenue risk that sub-central 
governments are exposed to, the freedom of use of the revenue obtained, the rules and formulas that define the 
distribution of financial revenue, and the institutional decision mechanisms defining each SCG’s annual share. In order 
to be considered a tax sharing, an arrangement must cumulatively fulfill all four criteria. A fiscal arrangement between 
levels of government can hence be called tax sharing if the amount going to each government level is a strict share of 
total tax revenue, if this share is predefined and cannot be changed in the course of the fiscal year, if the revenue for 
SCG is not earmarked, and if the revenue allocated to a single SCG either corresponds to the revenue it has collected, 
or is distributed across jurisdictions according to population, employees, or inversely related to tax raising capacity. 
Once agreed upon, the criteria can be used for collecting National Accounts and Revenue Statistics data.  
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Intergovernmental grants 
19. Intergovernmental transfers (or grants) provide sub-central governments with additional financial 
resources, thus filling the gap between own tax revenue and expenditure needs. The main objectives for 
intergovernmental grants can be roughly divided into subsidization of SCG services and the equalisation of 
fiscal disparities; often these reasons overlap. A flowering garden of intergovernmental grants has evolved, 
with grants having different purposes and different effects on sub-central governments’ behaviour. Rules 
and conditions attached to intergovernmental grants vary widely, ranging from transfers that grant full 
autonomy and come close to tax sharing, to grants where central government retains tight control. The 
following paragraphs give an overview on grants from a donors’ perspective, a classification of the various 
strings attached to grants, and the policy areas for which grants are used.  
Donors and recipients of grants 
20. Table 6 shows a simplified version of the National Accounts donor/recipient matrix of 
intergovernmental grants, with five donor levels (central, state, local, international and social security) and 
– depending on the country type – one or two recipient levels (local, or state and local). The category 
“international” displays funds directly allocated to SCG in some countries3. On the average, grants account 
for around a quarter of total tax revenue4; with Mexico having the largest grant system and Iceland the 
smallest in relative terms. With 72 percent central government provides the overwhelming part of grants to 
local governments in both federal and unitary countries, although in most federal countries (Belgium, 
Canada, Germany, and Switzerland) are states the main source for local governments. Around 3 percent of 
all grants flow across states/regions and 2 percent across local governments. However, such horizontal 
arrangements not always being recorded properly may be underestimated.  
21. In the period 2000 to 2004, the share of grants to total tax revenue remained almost stable (table 
7). However, average figures conceal that almost three quarters of countries experienced an above-average 
growth of transfers. In a majority of countries, transfer growth laid above total government expenditure 
growth (not shown in table 8). Grants from the central government, by far the most significant donor, rose 
by an annual 6 percent for states and 8 percent for local governments, exceeding the growth rate of total 
tax revenue. The international level emerges as a source for regional government finance, reflecting 
development assistance from the European Union to the regions. While some transfer growth reflects 
institutional reforms such as responsibility reassignment or a swap between tax revenue and grants, some 
transfer growth could be the result of creeping demand increases from sub-central governments and hint at 
growing pressure on the central budget. 
                                                     
3. The central government figures for Greece include EU grants. In other countries, grants are directly paid to 
the receiving sub-central government. 
4 . Intergovernmental grants are an expenditure item, and they should be set in relation to total expenditure. 
However, National Accounts data on government expenditure are lacking for a number of countries, so 
total tax revenue was used as a proxy, which was taken from the Revenue Statistics.   
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Table 6: Grants by donor and recipient sub-sector, 2004 
As a percentage of total grant revenue
Country
As a 
percentage of 
total tax 
revenue
Central 
level
State 
level
Local 
level
International 
level
Social 
Security Total
Australia2 11.0
   State 9.8 100.0 - - - - 100.0
   Local 1.3 61.8 38.2 - - - 100.0
Austria 15.2
   State 11.5 69.4 5.1 3.8 0.6 21.1 100.0
   Local 3.8 49.2 16.1 12.7 0.3 21.7 100.0
Belgium 11.1
   State 3.9 81.3 13.9 3.6 1.0 0.1 100.0
   Local 7.1 26.4 73.3 - - 0.3 100.0
Canada 17.5
   State 9.0 99.8 - 0.2 - - 100.0
   Local 8.5 0.4 99.6 - - - 100.0
Czech Republic 12.4
   Local 12.4 99.1 - - 0.9 - 100.0
Denmark 13.4
   Local 13.4 99.5 - - 0.5 - 100.0
Finland 12.1
   Local 12.1 98.5 - - 1.5 - 100.0
France 8.6
   Local 8.6 97.0 - - 3.0 - 100.0
Germany 12.8
   Länder 5.9 79.0 - 14.7 6.4 - 100.0
   Local 7.0 1.4 98.4 - - 0.2 100.0
Greece2 4.1
   Local 4.1 100.0 - - - - 100.0
Hungary 16.7
   Local 16.7 67.2 - 3.0 0.5 29.4 100.0
Iceland 1.9
   Local 1.9 100.0 - - - - 100.0
Italy1 19.1
  Regional 12.7 94.8 - - 5.2 - 100.0
   Local 6.4 54.3 45.7 - - - 100.0
Korea 34.4
   Local 34.4 82.6 - 17.4 - - 100.0
Mexico 43.4
   State3 43.4 100.0 - - - - 100.0
   Local
Netherlands2 27.8
   Local 27.8 100.0 - - - - 100.0
Norway 11.3
   Local 11.3 100.0 - - - - 100.0
Poland2 37.9
   Local 37.9 99.6 - 0.4 - - 100.0
Portugal 7.8
   Local 7.8 86.5 - - 12.9 0.6 100.0
Spain 19.4
  Regional 14.0 77.7 - 16.7 - 5.6 100.0
   Local 5.5 66.6 31.2 - - 2.2 100.0
Sweden 9.4
   Local 9.4 100.0 - - - - 100.0
Switzerland 23.4
   State 16.1 73.7 5.6 20.7 - - 100.0
   Local 7.2 0.2 77.6 22.3 - - 100.0
Turkey 15.8
   Local 15.8 100.0 - - - - 100.0
Unweighted average
   State 14.0 86.2 2.7 6.6 1.5 3.0 100.0
   Local 11.8 72.3 21.8 2.5 0.9 2.5 100.0
1. 2002 figures.
2. 2003 figures.
3. Including grants to local government.
Source : National sources and OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.  
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Table 7: Changes to grants by donor and recipient sub-sector, 2000 to 2004  
Annual growth rates 2000-2004
Country
Change in 
total tax 
revenue
Central 
level
State
 level
Local 
level International
Social 
Security
Australia1 -0.8
   State -0.7 1.2 - - - -
   Local -0.1 9.3 -7.2 - - -
Austria -0.7
   State -0.3 3.9 -8.6 0.9 1.8 1.7
   Local -0.5 -0.2 9.8 -7.9 19.4 -0.1
Belgium 1.4
   State 0.8 11.1 1.9 13.6 45.0 -18.4
   Local 0.6 14.9 3.0 - - -5.3
Canada 1.4
   State 0.9 5.7 - -31.3 - -
   Local 0.5 -3.9 4.0 - - -
Czech Republic 6.8
   Local 6.8 30.8 - - - -
Denmark 2.5
   Local 2.5 8.3 - - - -
Finland 3.9
   Local 3.9 12.1 - - 6.0 -
France 1.3
   Local 1.3 6.5 - - - -
Germany -0.1
   Länder 0.0 -0.2 - 0.7 0.8 -
   Local -0.1 4.5 -0.4 - - -2.4
Greece1 0.8
   Local 0.8 13.4 - - - -
Hungary 1.7
   Local 1.7 13.9 - 6.5 - 12.9
Iceland 0.4
   Local 0.4 14.6 - - - -
Korea 1.3
   Local 1.3 9.6 - 11.6 - -
Mexico 3.6
   State2 3.6 11.1 - - - -
   Local
Netherlands1 3.6
   Local 3.6 7.2 - - - -
Norway -3.5
   Local -3.5 -2.3 - - - -
Poland1 2.1
   Local 2.1 8.0 - -12.4 - -
Portugal 0.7
   Local 0.7 7.3 - - 5.0 17.6
Spain -7.1
  Regional -6.6 9.7 - 15.3 - -40.6
   Local -0.5 4.5 10.8 - - -17.0
Switzerland 1.5
   State 1.0 2.5 13.8 -0.4 - -
   Local 0.5 -3.1 1.9 6.4 - -
Turkey -19.2
   Local -19.2 10.6 - - - -
Unweighted average
   State -0.2 6.4 1.0 -0.3 6.7 -8.2
   Local 0.2 8.3 1.1 0.2 1.5 0.3
1. 2003 figures.
2. Including grants to local government.
Source : National sources and OECD Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.
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Taxonomy of grants 
22. The design of grants should be captured with a taxonomy that reflects their variety (figure 3)5. 
The main dividing line separates earmarked from non-earmarked grants; a distinction crucial for assessing 
sub-central fiscal autonomy. Both types of grants can be divided further into mandatory and discretionary 
transfers, reflecting the legal background that governs their allocation. Earmarked grants may be further 
subdivided into matching and non-matching grants, i.e. whether the transfer is linked to SCG own 
expenditure or not. A final subdivision is between grants for capital expenditure and grants for current 
expenditure. On the non-earmarked side grants may be further subdivided into block and general purpose 
grants, where the latter provide more freedom of use; since both forms are unconditional, the distinction 
often collapses. The taxonomy is consistent with the one established by the Council of Europe. 
Figure 3: A taxonomy of grants  
 
Grants 
Non-earmarked 
General purpose grant 
Earmarked 
Non-matching grant 
Mandatory
Discretionary 
Mandatory
Discretionary
Block grant
Matching grant
Capital grants
Current grants
 
23. With roughly 60 percent, non-earmarked grants account for a larger part of total grant revenue, 
but the remaining 40 percent give the central level a strong stake in SCG budgets (table 8). It is slightly 
surprising to see that earmarked grants, and hence central control, are more important for state and regional 
governments than for local governments. Around a third of earmarked grants is matching, i.e. linked to 
SCG own expenditure. Through lowering the price of sub-central public services matching grants are 
thought to foster spending, but by doing this may put some pressure on both central and sub-central 
budgets. Around three quarters of all earmarked grants are mandatory, giving SCG more revenue security 
but leaving less scope for central governments to adjust expenditures rapidly to overall fiscal conditions. 
Only one quarter of earmarked transfers can be – at least from a legal, if not political, point of view - 
adjusted within short notice. Whether discretionary transfers fluctuate more than mandatory grants remains 
to be analyzed once data for a longer time period are available.  
                                                     
5 . Details on how block grants are distinguished from general purpose grants can be found in Bergvall, 
Charbit and Kraan (2006). 
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Table 8: Grant revenue by type of grant, 2004 
As percentage of total grant revenue
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Australia
   State - - - - 81.6 11.3 2.9 - 4.1 100.0
   Local - - - - 16.7 - 83.3 - - 100.0
Austria
   State 57.0 1.8 2.0 18.4 0.6 12.5 0.2 7.5 100.0
   Local 39.3 3.5 7.4 34.8 1.2 13.7 0.1 0.0 100.0
Belgium
   State 67.2 10.9 14.7 1.0 0.1 6.0 - - 100.0
   Local 71.6 0.1 0.5 23.8 4.0 - - 100.0
Canada
   State - - 18.6 - - 81.4 - - 100.0
   Local - - 91.4 4.3 - - 4.3 - - 100.0
Czech Republic
   Local 12.4 - - 74.1 13.6 - - - 100.0
Denmark
   Local 37.9 0.8 4.9 0.1 56.2 - 0.0 100.0
Finland
   Local 5.7 - - 1.8 1.6 16.3 74.0 0.6 100.0
France
   Local 6.5 0.1 1.3 3.8 81.9 6.4 - 100.0
Greece
   Local 61.3 38.7 - - - - - - - 100.0
Hungary
   Local 40.1 7.4 - - 3.8 5.6 41.9 - 1.1 100.0
Iceland
   Local 3.0 8.4 6.5 3.1 79.0 - - 100.0
Italy1
  Regional 4.7 4.7 10.6 8.7 71.4 - - 100.0
   Local - - 39.4 36.1 24.5 - - 100.0
Korea
   Local 6.4 - - 11.2 10.2 69.9 - 2.4 100.0
Mexico
   State2 53.9 - - 5.3 40.8 - - 100.0
   Local
Netherlands3
   Local 73.6 - - - - 26.4 - 100.0
Norway
   Local 12.2 9.4 19.4 3.9 - 55.1 - 100.0
Poland
   Local 24.1 5.4 - - - - 70.5 - - 100.0
Portugal
   Local - - - - 11.4 85.0 - 3.6 100.0
Spain
  Regional 8.1 5.4 - - 0.9 0.5 85.2 - - 100.0
   Local 14.3 16.4 3.1 - - 66.2 - - 100.0
Sweden
   Local - - - - 0.7 28.1 71.3 - - 100.0
Switzerland
   State 64.8 12.9 - - - - 22.2 - - 100.0
   Local 71.7 8.7 - - - - 19.6 - - 100.0
Turkey
   Local - - - - 77.3 - - 22.7 100.0
Unweighted average
   State 31.4 4.5 4.4 2.9 12.5 2.6 40.3 0.0 1.5 100.0
   Local 22.9 3.8 5.7 1.9 9.2 9.9 38.8 6.5 1.5 100.0
1. 2002 figures.
2. Including grants to local government.
3. 2003 figures.
Source : National sources.
Earmarked grants Non earmarked grants
Total
Mandatory
Discretionary
Mandatory
Matching Non-Matching
General 
purpose grants
Block 
grants
Discretionary
 
 18
 Change in 2000-2004, percentage points
Current Capital Current Capital Current Capital
Australia
   State - - - - 12.0 -0.2 -13.6 - 1.8
   Local - - - - 9.6 -0.5 -9.1 - -
Austria
   State 2.3 -0.7 -0.9 -1.2 0.0 0.8 0.0 -0.2
   Local 0.7 -5.5 2.5 -0.2 -0.3 2.8 0.0 0.0
Belgium
   State -6.9 9.7 -2.1 1.0 -0.3 -1.3 -
   Local -15.5 -3.2 0.0 -2.0 23.1 -2.4 -
Canada
   State - - -0.6 - - 0.6 - -
   Local - - -0.4 -0.2 - - 0.6 - -
Czech Republic
   Local -16.8 - - 33.7 -16.9 - - -
Denmark
   Local -1.9 0.2 0.8 0.0 0.9 - 0.0
Finland
   Local -4.1 - - 0.2 -1.5 16.3 -10.1 -0.8
France
   Local -1.2 0.0 -1.1 -1.1 6.7 -3.3 -
Greece
   Local 7.7 -7.7 - - - - - - -
Hungary
   Local -0.5 -1.7 - - -1.3 0.6 6.0 - -3.1
Iceland
   Local -15.4 1.2 -11.3 0.7 24.8 - -
Korea
   Local -2.9 - - 0.7 -1.3 3.2 - 0.3
Mexico
   State2 3.8 - - -0.4 -3.4 - -
   Local
Netherlands1
   Local 5.0 - - - - -5.0 -
Norway
   Local -8.7 8.4 2.2 0.7 - -2.6 -
Poland
   Local -8.4 -1.0 - - - - 9.4 - -
Portugal
   Local - - - - -5.1 1.5 - 3.6
Spain
  Regional -35.3 0.9 - - 0.0 0.1 34.3 - -
   Local -1.5 3.0 0.6 - - -2.1 - -
Switzerland
   State 1.4 -1.9 - - - - 0.5 - -
   Local -1.9 -2.1 - - - - 3.9 - -
Turkey
   Local - - - - 12.4 - - -12.4
Unweighted average
   State -5.0 1.1 -0.5 -0.2 1.8 -0.1 2.6 0.0 0.2
   Local -3.6 -1.0 0.7 0.0 1.4 0.2 3.2 -0.9 0.0
1. 2003 figures.
2. Including grants to local government.
Source : National sources.
Discretionary
Earmarked grants Non earmarked grants
Mandatory
Discretionary
Mandatory
Matching Non-Matching General 
purpose grants
Block 
grants
Table 9: Grant revenue by type of grant 
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As percentage of total earmarked grants
General 
public 
services
Defence Public order and safety 
Economic 
affaires
Environment 
protection
Housing and 
community 
amenities
Health
Recreation, 
culture, 
religion
Education Social protection Others Total
01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Australia - - 0.2 9.0 - 4.9 39.6 0.1 37.5 8.4 0.3 100.0
Austria
Belgium - - 24.3 21.4 - - 0.1 - 25.3 28.9 - 100.0
Canada
Czech Republic 9.3 0.0 0.5 6.0 0.3 7.5 2.2 0.7 54.3 17.7 1.4 100.0
Denmark
Finland 5.5 - 0.6 17.2 1.8 0.4 12.0 16.9 27.0 18.7 - 100.0
France 16.9 1.7 8.0 13.0 2.3 22.4 - 30.8 5.0 - - 100.0
Germany 
Greece 56.6 - - 18.9 5.6 5.6 - 7.2 - 6.1 - 100.0
Hungary
Iceland
Italy1 16.9 - - 40.6 3.8 - 31.7 - 7.0 - - 100.0
Korea
Mexico
Netherlands 0.0 - 0.6 1.4 1.1 8.6 5.3 0.5 22.4 50.2 9.9 100
Norway 79.3 0.2 0.1 - 0.0 0.1 14.0 - 4.7 1.7 - 100.0
Poland 3.1 3.5 16.2 4.4 8.9 5.5 10.8 5.2 17.9 24.6 - 100.0
Portugal 3.2 26.0 - 61.3 9.5 100.0
Spain 42.4 - 0.2 35.4 0.6 3.2 4.7 0.9 2.5 10.0 - 100.0
Sweden 3.5 1.1 0.0 6.2 3.8 - 56.3 - 29.1 - - 100.0
Switzerland
Turkey 43.2 - - 14.2 19.1 22.2 - 0.9 - 0.5 - 100.0
Unweighted average 20.0 0.5 3.6 15.3 3.4 5.7 17.0 4.5 16.6 11.9 1.5 100.0
1. 2002
Source : National sources.
 
Table 10: Grants by government function, 2004 
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24. Grant design has little evolved between 2000 and 2004, except for the strong increase in the share 
of earmarked matching grants, at the expense of almost any other transfer type (table 9). This evolution 
could mean that matching grants indeed exert some pressure on central – and also sub-central - budgets. 
The share of non earmarked grants has slightly increased, pointing at more fiscal leeway for SCG, whereby 
the local level has benefited more than the state and regional level. Again structural change varies widely 
across countries, pointing at some path-dependency of the intergovernmental transfer system. 
Grants by government function 
25. Grants are used for different policy areas or government functions (table 10). The National 
Accounts divide government activities into ten functions in the so-called Classification of Functions of 
Government (COFOG), and this division is also applied to intergovernmental grants. Data are available 
only for earmarked grants because unconditional grants are not tied to specific government functions. 
While National Accounts data are available for eight countries, the questionnaire asked all countries to 
provide data with the same precision as provided by the National Accounts. In the end the data of eleven 
countries could be used to assess and compare the functional structure of intergovernmental grants.  
26. The category “general public services” accounts for the largest, rather unspecific share of 
intergovernmental transfers. Education is the second largest category, pointing at the weight of local and 
regional governments in providing primary and secondary education, with central government retaining 
considerable control over funding and regulation. “Economic affairs” is the third largest category, largely 
reflecting the weight of shared responsibilities in local and regional development policy. Again the grant 
structure varies widely, reflecting the different responsibility assignments and funding arrangements in 
countries. In general, except for “defence” and “public order and safety”, some degree of responsibility 
sharing and overlapping characterizes most government functions. However, the low number of country 
responses does not yet allow for stringent conclusions. 
Fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments 
Revenue structure 
27. Sub-central governments rely on own tax revenue, shared taxes and intergovernmental grants. In 
table 11 the three main categories of fiscal revenue are put together, to allow for an overall assessment and 
comparison across SCGs. In order to facilitate the reading of the table, a number of tax autonomy and 
intergovernmental grant categories are aggregated. Finally nine categories encompass the different revenue 
sources available to state and local governments. As for all statistics in this document, borrowing and fees 
are not included due to the lack of comparable data. 
28. With an un-weighted average of roughly 60 percent against 40 percent, tax revenue accounts for 
a larger share of SCG revenue than intergovernmental grants (table 11). With 38 percent autonomous taxes 
are the single largest category. Earmarked grants follow as the second largest category with 22 percent, 
indicating that more than one fifth of total revenue is largely outside the discretion of SCG. Non-earmarked 
grants account for 19 percent, while tax sharing arrangements – widely used in constitutionally federal 
countries – account for 16 percent. Countries with tax sharing arrangements have a smaller grant system 
and vice versa, suggesting some substitutability between the two fiscal arrangements. Again there is wide 
variation across countries; while for some tiers own tax revenue accounts for the overwhelming part 
(Canada states, Switzerland states), for others it is tax sharing (Australia states, Austria local, Germany 
states, Czech Republic), for others again it is either earmarked or non-earmarked grants (Greece, Mexico, 
Netherlands). 
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Table 11: Revenue structure of sub-central governments, 2002 
As a percentage of total sub-central revenue
Autonomous taxes Tax sharing Grants Total
Discretion 
on rates 
and reliefs
Discretion 
on rates
Discretion 
on reliefs
Revenue 
split set by 
SCG
Revenue 
split set 
with SCG 
consent
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, 
pluriannual
Revenue 
split set by 
CG, annual
Earmarked Non earmarked
Australia
 States 41.1 - - - 34.4 - - - 21.9 2.7 100.0
 Local 80.6 - - - - - - - 3.1 16.2 100.0
Austria
 States 3.7 - - - 43.5 - - 5.5 37.4 10.0 100.0
 Local 2.3 4.5 - - 55.4 - - 21.2 14.3 2.3 100.0
Belgium
 States 57.1 - - - 32.4 - - - 9.7 0.8 100.0
 Local 7.5 65.0 - - - - - 2.7 23.8 0.9 100.0
Canada
  Provinces 76.0 - - - 5.5 - - - 3.0 15.5 100.0
  Local 1 0.9 47.7 - - - - - 1.3 48.0 2.2 100.0
Czech Republic
   Local 3.2 2.4 - - - 51.8 - 0.9 41.7 - 100.0
Denmark
   Local - 67.9 - - - 2.2 - 4.8 12.5 12.6 100.0
Finland 
    Local - 60.4 - - - - 6.7 0.1 3.4 29.4 100.0
France
  Local 39.3 4.6 5.0 - - - - 5.6 5.7 39.8 100.0
Germany
   Länder - 1.9 - - 68.2 - - 8.9 21.0 100.0
   Local 8.7 16.7 - - 23.7 - - 0.6 50.3 100.0
Greece
  Local - 11.6 - 6.3 - - - - 82.1 - 100.0
Italy
   Regional - 28.4 - - 11.4 8.5 - - 14.8 36.9 100.0
   Local 12.1 22.6 - - - 5.9 - 4.2 41.7 13.5 100.0
Korea
  Local - 24.9 - - - - - 12.8 18.0 44.3 100.0
Mexico
  States3 5.0 - - - - - - - 54.4 40.6 100.0
  Local
Netherlands
   Local - 11.8 - - - - - 0.1 61.7 26.5 100.0
Norway
  Local 1.6 - 45.3 - - - - - 24.2 29.0 100.0
Poland
   Local - 11.7 - - - 38.6 - 0.2 17.9 31.6 100.0
Portugal
   Local - 21.2 - - - 8.9 - 18.1 5.7 46.0 100.0
Spain
  Regions 32.6 0.1 - - 23.3 - - 0.0 7.0 37.1 100
  Local 16.1 30.4 - - 12.7 - - 0.0 13.1 27.8 100
Sweden2
  Local - 74.0 - - - - - - 7.5 18.5 100.0
Switzerland
  States 57.4 - - - 6.1 - - - 28.0 8.5 100.0
  Local 2.0 66.9 - - - - - - 25.2 5.9 100.0
Unweighted average
  States 30.3 3.4 - - 25.0 0.9 - 1.6 21.9 16.9 100.0
  Local 9.2 28.6 2.6 0.3 4.8 5.6 0.4 3.8 26.3 18.2 100.0
1. Local figures with Quebec tax autonomy.
2. 2004 
3. Including grants to local government.
Source  : National sources and OECD Revenue statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.
Other taxes
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Fiscal autonomy indicator set 
29. Fiscal autonomy of sub-central governments is multi-faceted and must be assessed using several 
indicators. Table 12 provides a summary of fiscal autonomy indicators developed in this document, 
including the share of tax revenue allocated to sub-central governments, the discretion over those taxes, the 
share of transfers allocated to sub-central governments and the percentage of earmarked transfers. 
Although not treated in this document, two indicators for fiscal rules are added, reflecting, respectively, the 
right to run deficits and the right to borrow (box 2). 
Box 2: Fiscal rules and their impact on sub-central government autonomy 
Rules constraining the discretionary power of sub-central budget policymakers have become quite widespread 
among OECD economies. While fiscal rules for sub-central governments can be a means to achieve sustainable long-
term aggregate finance, they reduce the power governments have over their own budget. The same fiscal rules can 
therefore be viewed from both a “stringency” and an “autonomy” perspective; with a more stringent rule assumed to 
reduce the discretion a SCG has over its budget or selected budget items.  
In order to assess the extent SCG fiscal autonomy is constrained by fiscal rules, two indicators for fiscal rules 
stringency were calculated based on Sutherland, Price and Joumard (2006). A simple linear transformation of these 
indicators yields “fiscal rule autonomy” indicators. The ”fiscal rule autonomy" indicators have the same dimensions as 
the other fiscal autonomy indicators shown in table 12 and the same meaning, i.e. the higher the value, the more 
lenient the respective rule and the higher sub-central budget autonomy. 
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Table 12: Summary of fiscal autonomy indicators 
Percentages 
SCG tax 
revenue/
Total tax 
revenues
Discretion on 
rates and reliefs / 
Total SCG tax 
revenues
Total grants/
Total tax 
revenues
Non earmarked  
grants /
  Total grants
Budget and 
deficit autonomy
Borrowing 
autonomy
SCG 
autonomous / 
Total tax 
revenues
Australia 31.4 58.8 11.0 13.1 18.5
 States 28.4 54.4 9.8 7.1 10.0 62.5 15.4
 Local 3.0 100.0 1.3 83.3 10.0 62.5 3.0
Austria 18.4 7.6 15.2 19.0 1.4
 States 8.8 7.0 11.5 20.2 40.0 100.0 0.6
 Local 9.6 8.1 3.8 13.9 40.0 100.0 0.8
Belgium 27.8 69.7 11.1 5.3 19.4
 States 22.8 63.8 3.9 6.0 14.6
 Local 5.0 96.4 7.1 4.0 4.8
Canada 44.1 94.1 17.5 43.9 41.5
  Provinces 35.5 93.3 9.0 81.4 33.1
  Local 8.6 97.4 8.5 4.3 8.4
Czech Republic 12.5 9.6 12.4 0.0 1.2
   Local 12.5 9.6 12.4 0.0 70.0 62.5 1.2
Denmark 35.6 90.7 13.4 56.3 32.3
   Local 35.6 90.7 13.4 56.3 0.0 25.0 32.3
Finland 21.5 89.9 12.1 90.8 19.3
   Local 21.5 89.9 12.1 90.8 60.0 75.0 19.3
France 10.0 89.8 8.6 88.3 8.1
   Local 10.0 89.8 8.6 88.3 60.0 37.5 8.1
Germany 28.7 14.2 12.8 43.4 4.1
   Länder 21.8 2.4 5.9 42.5 70.0 87.5 0.5
   Local 7.0 51.1 7.0 44.4 0.0 62.5 3.6
Greece 0.9 64.6 4.1 0.0 0.6
   Local 0.9 64.6 4.1 0.0 0.6
Hungary 16.7 43.1
local 16.7 43.1
Iceland 25.2 91.2 1.9 79.0 23.0
   Local 25.2 91.2 1.9 79.0 100.0 62.5 23.0
Italy 16.4 64.7 19.1 55.1 10.6
   Regional 11.3 58.8 12.7 71.4 6.6
   Local 5.2 77.6 6.4 24.5 4.0
Japan 26.0 79.8 20.8
   Local 26.0 79.8 70.0 50.0 20.8
Korea 18.9 64.3 34.4 72.3 12.1
   Local 18.9 64.3 34.4 72.3 60.0 12.5 12.1
Mexico 3.4 100.0 43.4 40.8 3.4
  States 2.4 100.0 43.4 40.8 2.4
  Local 1.0 100.0 0.0 1.0
Netherlands 3.6 99.2 27.8 26.4 3.6
   Local 3.6 99.2 27.8 26.4 0.0 75.0 3.6
Norway 12.9 100.0 11.3 55.1 12.9
   Local 12.9 100.0 11.3 55.1 40.0 50.0 12.9
Poland 17.5 23.2 37.9 70.5 4.1
   Local 17.5 23.2 37.9 70.5 80.0 37.5 4.1
Portugal 6.0 44.0 7.9 88.6 2.6
   Local 6.0 44.0 7.9 88.6 60.0 37.5 2.6
Spain 26.6 64.8 19.4 79.9 17.3
  Regions 18.1 58.4 14.0 85.2 0.0 25.0 10.6
   Local 8.5 78.6 5.5 66.2 0.0 37.5 6.7
Sweden 32.1 100.0 9.4 32.1
   Local 32.1 100.0 9.4 40.0 100.0 32.1
Switzerland 43.1 94.0 23.4 21.4 40.6
  States 27.0 90.4 16.1 22.2 70.0 75.0 24.4
  Local 16.2 100.0 7.2 19.6 60.0 37.5 16.2
Turkey 6.5 0.0 15.8 22.7 0.0
   Local 6.5 0.0 15.8 22.7 70.0 25.0 0.0
United Kingdom 4.5 100.0 4.5
   Local 4.5 100.0 4.5
Unweighted Average
   States 19.6 58.7 14.0 41.9 38.0 70.0 12.0
   Local 12.4 73.1 11.3 45.4 45.6 52.8 9.4
Source : National sources and OECD,  Revenue Statistics 1965-2004, 2005 Edition.  
 24
30. Altogether, the table comprises six indicators capturing fiscal autonomy from different angles. 
The seventh indicator “share of autonomous SCG tax revenue” is the product of the sub-central tax 
revenue share and the autonomy over those taxes; this product comes closest to what one could call a 
composite indicator of fiscal autonomy. Correlation between indicators is weak, and statistical concepts 
like factor analysis fail to produce a single “summary indicator of sub-central fiscal autonomy”6. 
A few (non)correlations among fiscal autonomy indicators 
31. As described above, the various indicators for fiscal autonomy are not or only weakly correlated, 
pointing at the multidimensionality of fiscal autonomy and the great diversity of fiscal institutions in 
OECD countries. Some of these non-correlations are interesting from a policy perspective since they may 
either support or contradict a number of beliefs on the relationship between policy variables in the area of 
decentralized public finance. The following scatter diagrams show a number of simple two-dimensional 
relationships. 
Figure 4: Relationship between fiscal autonomy indicators 
Chart 1. Subcentral tax share and subcentral tax autonomy
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6. This supports the findings of Sutherland, Price and Joumard who found very little correlation between 
indicators for fiscal rules (Sutherland, Price and Joumard, 2005). 
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Chart 2. Subcentral tax share and size of the grant system
TUR
CHE
SWE
ESP
PRT
POL
NOR
NLD
MEX
KOR
ITA
ISL
GRC
DEU
FRA
FIN
DNK
CZE
CAN
BEL
AUT
AUS
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
40.0
45.0
50.0
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0
SCG tax revenues as % of total tax revenues
Total grants as % of total tax revenue
 
Source: National sources and Revenue Statistics 1965-2004 
Chart 3.  Subcentral tax share and budget autonomy
TUR
CHE Local
CHE State
SWE
ESP Local
ESP Regions
PRT
POL
NOR
NLD
KOR
JPN
ISL
DEU Local
DEU Länder
FRA
FIN
DNK
CZE
AUT Local
AUT State
AUS Local
AUS State
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0
Budget & deficit autonomy
SCG autonomous as % of total tax revenue
  
Source: National sources and Revenue Statistics 1965-2004 
 26
• The first scatter diagram shows the relationship between the share of sub-central tax revenue and 
the degree of autonomy over these taxes. The share of sub-central government’s own tax revenue 
is hardly related to their autonomy over those taxes. While in some countries SCGs have wide 
discretion over a small tax base, in some other countries SCGs have very little autonomy over a 
large tax base, especially in tax sharing arrangements. The picture again supports the view that a 
simple share of tax revenue is a poor measure to assess true fiscal autonomy of sub-central 
governments and that for analytical purposes – e.g. assessing the impact of decentralization on 
aggregate finance - more sophisticated indicators should be used. 
• The second scatter diagram shows the relationship between the share of sub-central tax revenue 
and the size of the grant system. While fiscal policy could substitute own tax revenue for 
intergovernmental grants and vice versa, there is actually no relationship between the two fiscal 
arrangements. While in some countries small local tax revenue meets with a small grant system, 
others combine large local tax revenue with a large fiscal gap and an extended transfer system to 
cover it. Only unconditional grants (not shown in the figure) and own tax revenue seem to be 
substitutes, which points to the close relationship between tax sharing and grants arrangements. 
Policy makers might actually be interested to know how and under what conditions increased 
sub-central tax autonomy can reduce the need for intergovernmental transfers. Panel data and a 
deeper look into the design of intergovernmental fiscal institutions could reveal the dynamics 
between SCG tax revenue and grants. 
• The third scatter diagram shows the relationship between the share of sub-central tax revenue and 
the extent to which SCG are allowed to run deficits. This figure actually assesses whether 
countries with high sub-central taxing power apply stricter rules on fiscal behaviour. The lack of 
a close relationship suggests that in practice fiscal rules are neither a substitute nor a complement 
for SCG autonomy. Some countries grant SCG large tax autonomy but impose strict fiscal rules, 
others are likely to do the reverse, while some countries restrict both forms of fiscal autonomy. 
Large local and regional tax autonomy is neither coupled to strict nor to lenient fiscal rules.  
32. Any conclusion with respect to the relationship between different fiscal autonomy indicators 
must be taken with great care since those indicators represent only one point in time. To assess the 
dynamics between different autonomy indicators one needs to observe fiscal design and its outcome over 
several time periods. What those indicators say after all is that fiscal federal design is partially country-
specific and its evolution likely to be path-dependent.  
Summary and outlook for policy analysis 
33. This article assessed the power sub-central governments have over their revenue sources. For that 
purpose, a detailed set of indicators was developed encompassing both tax autonomy and autonomy over 
revenue from intergovernmental grants. Tax revenue was divided into categories ranging from full 
autonomy over tax bases and rates to no autonomy at all, while revenue from intergovernmental grants is 
divided into earmarked and non-earmarked grants. The resulting indicators are supposed to give a more 
accurate picture of the true fiscal power that sub-central governments enjoy. 
34. Results suggest that state and local discretion over fiscal resources is limited and that the simple 
share of sub-central to total revenue overstates SCG fiscal power. In particular: 
- The taxing power of sub-central governments is limited. Sub-central governments command 
60 percent of their own tax revenue only, while the remaining 40 percent are part of tax 
sharing arrangements or under entire control of the central government. Taxing power is 
lower for state than for local governments. With 31 percent, the share of sub-central to total 
tax revenue remained stable over the period 1995-2002, but the autonomy over this share has 
slightly increased. 
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- Sub-central taxation relies strongly on mobile taxes. With more than 40 percent, the highly 
mobile personal and corporate income tax revenue accounts for the largest part of sub-central 
tax revenue. Taxes on immovable property account for 19 percent only. Many taxes 
potentially prone to spatial mobility are part of tax sharing arrangements or fiscal equalisation 
arrangements that limit the danger of sub-central tax erosion. 
- A large part of intergovernmental grants is earmarked. With roughly 60 percent, non-
earmarked grants account for a large part of total grant revenue, but the remaining 40 percent 
give central governments still a strong stake in SCG budgets. Earmarked grants are more 
important for state and regional governments than for local governments. On average, 
expenditures on grants have increased more than total government expenditure, pointing to a 
certain pressure on the central budget. 
- Taxes are more important a revenue source than grants. Tax revenue accounts for 60 percent 
of sub-central revenue, while grants account for 40 percent. Autonomous taxes are the single 
largest category with 38 percent, but earmarked grants follow as the second largest category 
with 22 percent. Tax sharing arrangements account for 16 percent. Countries with tax sharing 
arrangements have a smaller grant system and vice versa, suggesting some substitutability 
between the two fiscal arrangements.  
- Fiscal autonomy indicators are largely uncorrelated. There is no single pattern of sub-central 
fiscal design, and at least partially fiscal federal design is country specific and path-
dependent. If set against each other, the various indicators used reveal that there is no 
relationship between the share of sub-central tax revenue and tax autonomy, nor between the 
amount of sub-central tax revenue and the size of the grants system, nor between the extent of 
fiscal autonomy and the stringency of fiscal rules.  
35. Although a part of fiscal federal design is utterly country specific and its evolution path-
dependent, some policy issues are common to all or most countries. The new database can open the way 
for a more focussed analysis of several key issues:  
- Fiscal autonomy and fiscal stability. A key policy issue in fiscal federalism is how sub-central 
autonomy affects fiscal stability. Evidence on this is scant and inconclusive. While some 
policy research suggests that fiscal autonomy leads to a deficit bias (e.g. de Mello, 2000) or 
has pro-cyclical effects (e.g. Wibbels and Rodden, 2005), others come to opposite findings 
(e.g. Neyapti, 2003 or Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002). One of the main reasons for inconclusive 
results is the poor data used for defining fiscal autonomy. The refined dataset developed in 
this article allows better assessing the link between fiscal federal arrangements and fiscal 
outcomes and may give more precise guidance on whether autonomy is compatible with 
stability. 
- Autonomy and efficient public service delivery: Another policy issue is whether ceding more 
fiscal autonomy to the sub-central level will increase or decrease public service efficiency. 
Although higher autonomy is thought to be associated with higher efficiency, governments 
are often hesitant to increase taxing power or to substitute earmarked for general grants, 
fearing that without proper central regulation sub-central jurisdictions are either unable or 
unwilling to deliver an efficient and equitable access to public services. Linked to outcome 
variables the new database can help evaluate the effect of different budget rules and funding 
arrangements on sub-central spending efficiency.  
- Sub-central taxes versus intergovernmental grants. Countries have adopted different 
approaches towards funding sub-central public services. While some give taxing power to 
sub-central governments, others use intergovernmental grants. The substitutability between 
 28
both arrangements raises policy questions such as: which arrangement allows for higher 
public service efficiency? Which arrangement leads to more equity across jurisdictions? 
Which arrangement puts more pressure on central and sub-central budgets, and what role can 
fiscal rules play? The new dataset can be used to assess the relationship between the two 
fiscal federal arrangements and their interaction with the various policy objectives.  
- Which taxes at the sub central level? Contrary to the allegations of fiscal federal theory, 
highly mobile income taxes make up for more than 40 percent of average sub-central 
government revenue. While this arrangement functions well in a number of countries – since 
mobile taxes are often built into tax sharing or fiscal equalisation -, in some others sub-central 
jurisdictions appear to struggle with tax erosion. A country-wise analysis of the new database 
can help identify tax arrangements that help maintain fiscal autonomy of the sub-central level 
while containing the potential drawbacks of tax mobility. 
36. In the coming years, the OECD Network on Fiscal Relations across Government Levels is poised 
to work on this policy agenda. 
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